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The Moldovan presidential election, which took place on 13 November, was framed as a straight choice between
pro-Russian and pro-European candidates. The subsequent victory of Igor Dodon has been viewed as marking the
end of Moldova’s Europeanisation and a potential return to Moscow’s sphere of influence, some seven years after
the ‘Twitter Revolution’ that brought down the Moldovan communists. Daniel Brett looks at why Dodon won, how he
won, and the potential consequences of his victory for the country.
Igor Dodon’s narrow victory in Moldova’s presidential election has been portrayed by some commentators as the
country returning to Russia’s sphere of influence and the end of its democratisation efforts. But why did voters really
choose to support Dodon over his rival Maia Sandu and what does Dodon’s victory mean for future developments in
Moldova?
Moldovan politics is often seen through the prism of geo and ethno-politics, but this does not tell the full story.
Dodon’s victory can be seen as a return of the ‘Old Guard’ and a reflection of the failure of the political elite tasked
with moving Moldova forward after the revolution. The events of 2009, when the so called ‘Twitter Revolution’
erupted against the then Communist government, did not usher in a new era of politics, but rather a battle for control
between Moldova’s two main oligarchs, Vlad Filat and Vlad Plahotniuc, each with their own parties supporting them.
The theft of one billion dollars from Moldovan banks led to the fall of the fragile ‘pro-European’ coalition and to the
jailing of Filat, although many viewed him as the fall-guy and instead point the finger at Plahotniuc.
A period of instability followed, in which Moldovan politicians put their own interests ahead of those of the country,
including rejecting the reformist former education Minister Maia Sandu as Prime Minister. Liberal Party leader Mihai
Ghimpu declared that ‘she will have to come to me, I won’t go to her’. Although Vlad Plahotniuc was unable to fulfil
his ambition of becoming Prime Minister, when a government was formed it was nevertheless viewed as
‘Plahotniuc’s government’ with the oligarch wielding power behind the scenes.
Until February 2016, Moldova had been a parliamentary system with the president largely a ceremonial figurehead
selected by parliament, until the Supreme Court decided to change the law and to make the presidency directly
elected, although remaining a largely ceremonial role. Suspicion again fell on Plahotniuc and his desire to
consolidate his power. However, his obvious unpopularity meant that even if he wanted to run for the presidency he
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would never win, despite his media resources.
The presidential campaign
The election quickly became a contest between three factions. First, there was a group based around the Socialist
(PSRM) leader Igor Dodon that spoke to rural, older, Russian and Gagauz voters and was seen as being backed by
Russia. The PSRM emerged from a split within the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova  (PCRM). The
split came about because many younger PCRM members (Dodon is 41) became frustrated by the party’s leader,
Vladimir Voronin, and his unwillingness to step aside.
Second, there was a faction that might be termed the ‘Plahotniuc group’ of established politicians who spoke of
being European in the hope that it might result in support from the West. Plahotniuc, with the aid of PR agency
Podesta, embarked on a not entirely successful campaign in the West to create the image of himself as a pro-
European businessman whose involvement in politics was purely altruistic, while pledging his support for European
candidates. Meanwhile his actions in Moldova were largely intended to secure the victory for a suitable candidate:
either his favoured choice or someone who would be favourable to him and his interests.
Finally, there was a group of younger pro-reform European politicians that eventually coalesced behind Maia Sandu.
Following the withdrawal of Plahotniuc’s favoured candidate Marian Lupu it became clear that in the first round the
question would be whether Dodon would manage to get over 50% of the vote, and thereby be elected without the
need for a second round. He did not achieve this, polling 48.5%, while Sandu placed second on 38.2%, therefore
necessitating the second round of voting on 13 November.
The second round saw particularly dirty campaigning. Although Plahotniuc spoke about supporting ‘European’
candidates, his media empire supported both Dodon and Ilan Shor – a banker who was involved in the 2014
banking theft and who has more recently been deployed by Sandu’s enemies. Unsolicited by Sandu, he wired
money to her election effort, which was leaked to a blogger and to the Moldovan media before the Sandu campaign
was even aware of the money.
In contrast to previous elections where the ‘pro-European’ parties had invested considerable efforts in encouraging
the diaspora to vote, this campaign was marked by attempts to disenfranchise the young and the diaspora via the
back door. Voters had to vote where they were registered, which disenfranchised in particular students living away
from home, while long queues and the lack of ballot papers made diaspora voting difficult. The Orthodox Church
also flexed its muscles by aligning itself with Dodon. It attacked Sandu for being an unmarried woman, re-enforcing
its role of the attack dog of East European politics.
It might be asked why Plahotniuc and others chose to support Dodon privately, while publically claiming to back
Sandu. Although they may be from different parties, many are cut from the same cloth as Dodon: part of the post-
Soviet elite who made their money in murky circumstances and whose commitment is to their bank balances first
and foremost. Indeed, Dodon was Economics Minister in the last Voronin government – the period when Plahotniuc
was able to gain control of various resources. Sandu, by virtue of her background outside of this elite and her track
record as Education minister, posed the greatest threat to this group.
Dodon’s campaign and support among ethnic Russians and Gagauz benefitted from the crass nationalist politics
emerging from Bucharest. The campaign to ‘re-unify’ Romania and Moldova has increased in volume in Romania,
although this is primarily aimed at domestic Romanian politics and is part of an increasingly nationalist tilt of politics
there. The same discussion plays out in Moldova as well, and naturally enough is a concern among ethnic Russian
and Gagauz voters. It is however worth noting that pro-Unification candidates polled under 3% of the vote in the first
round of the election, showing that despite the plans of Romanian nationalists, there is no appetite from anyone in
Moldova for unification.
At the same time, criticism can also be levelled at Sandu: during the campaign, she made few efforts to connect to
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rural, Russian or Gagauz voters. Her defeat was narrow and a more concerted effort to appeal to these voters may
have helped. It seems that Sandu and some Moldovan intellectuals have written off such voters as beyond
redemption, but by not even trying to reach out to them they left the field open to Dodon and other anti-reformists
who did attempt to appeal to them.
What does Dodon’s victory mean?
Dodon’s presidency will not be easy: Moldovan politics is deeply divided and the party system is highly volatile. It is
also important to note that the President lacks power in accordance with the constitution. However, Dodon’s political
instincts make it likely that he will attempt to consolidate power around himself. Faced with a divided parliament, he
can claim a popular mandate. He has already called for early elections: if the elections were won by the PSRM it is
likely that a situation similar to Romania under Ion Iliescu would arise, where the system is parliamentary on paper
but presidential in practice.
An early sign of the direction of Moldova under Dodon may be seen in his demand for the resignation of Defense
Minister Anatol Salaru and Security Council member Mihai Ghimpu. Dodon has no powers to sack them according to
the constitution and it is likely that this will be an early test of the relationship between parliament and president. The
results of this will potentially point to how domestic politics may unfold.
Dodon’s authoritarian populism could be seen in the run up to the election. In interviews he promised everything to
everyone, maintaining good relations with the EU alongside improving relations with Russia. The only firm policy
articulated was to reject unification. As for the fight against corruption, it is likely that anticorruption efforts will be
watered down or that they will become politicised.
There are three less certain areas. It is unclear what will become of the pro-reform opposition – will they be able to
work together and will they be able to make inroads? Secondly, what becomes of the populist Renato Usatii, who
served as both an ally and rival to Dodon, (but who is now subject to an Interpol arrest warrant and has fled to
Russia) as well as the Communist party who did not even run in the presidential election and are now a former
shadow of themselves?
The final area of uncertainty is Transnistria where there will be a presidential election on 11 December. With Dodon’s
ascent to power, some of the rationale for Transnistrian separation is reduced, but it is unlikely that the Transnistrian
leadership will willingly give up their power and wealth. Dodon is in favour of a federalist solution for Moldova, which
is potentially a workable compromise, but this would be a long-term project. He has also been critical of the
Transnistrian leadership, which does not bode so well for Chişinău-Tiraspol relations. The situation may depend on
whether Moscow would rather work with Chişinău rather than Tiraspol.
A swing to the East or more of the same?
Dodon’s victory is likely to improve relations with Moscow, while there will be a probable worsening of the
relationship with Kyiv and Bucharest (depending also on the results of the Romanian parliamentary elections on 11
December and how nationalistic Romanian politics becomes in the run up to the centenary of Romanian unification).
It is highly unlikely that Moldova will abandon its relationship with the European Union because it isn’t in the
interests of the economic elite to do so.
Where there may be a shift is in Dodon’s ability to extract concessions from the EU and US. While the ‘pro-
Europeans’ were able to extract some benefits from the EU, US and Romania, Dodon’s positive relationship with
Russia puts him in a position to potentially extract more for doing less. He is in a position to use his relationship with
Russia to leverage further concessions from the EU, weakening any conditionality that the EU/US may wish to put in
place.
Perhaps the most revealing insight into the thinking of the ‘pro-European’ politicians and elite came in an interview
shortly before the second round. Plahotniuc commented ‘the European brand is recovering’, in much the same way
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as one would describe a Burger chain recovering from a food poisoning scandal. For the Moldovan elite,
Europeanisation is not about political institutions, shared values, democratisation, or even a set of policy objectives,
but rather something akin to a marketing slogan.
While Dodon’s victory is a symbolic rejection of the ‘pro-European’ politicians who have led the country since 2009, it
is also unlikely to mark any radical re-orientation in Moldova’s domestic or international politics. Dodon’s victory is a
victory for the status quo. Political reform and anti-corruption efforts are likely to stall, and there is the potential for
conflict between parliament and president, but some progress on resolving the Transnistrian issue may well be
possible. The real winners in this election are Moldova’s oligarchs who have been able to defeat a candidate whose
reformist agenda threatened their interests.
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